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DEMOCRATIZATION IN UKRAINE: THE RELATIONSHIP  
OF VALUE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
The article is devoted to the problem of value and institutional relation in democratization of the 
Ukrainian society. Basing on the micro sociological theories and empirical researches of the values by 
R. Inglehart and Sh. Schwartz author is arguing that democratic values are the reasons for promoting the 
development and effectiveness of the democratic institutions and arrives at the conclusion that law has to 
become the value for the democratic institutions work efficiently in Ukraine. 
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WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE ORANGE REVOLUTION?
This article analyses why the promises made by the leaders of the Orange Revolution regarding reforms 
in Ukraine were not realized. Stressing the influence of the relations in the triangle EU – Ukraine – Russia, 
the author at the same time underlines that the main factors appeared to be the domestic ones.
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The Orange Revolution in late 2004 attracted 
attention of the whole world to Ukraine. It created a 
lot of expectations and hopes for Ukraine’s future 
moving towards the EU. Ukraine enjoyed political 
freedom. But the Orange government appeared to 
be ineffective. What went wrong and why?
Compromises and “pluralism by default”
Since perestroika, political development in 
Ukraine has evolved so that the country’s most 
important decisions were reached by compromise. In 
fact, Ukraine stands in contrast to many other former 
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Soviet republics in that it gained its independence 
peacefully and without interethnic conflict. This was 
a result of a compromise between the national-
democratic opposition and national-communists. 
Ukraine also became the first country of the CIS 
where democratic elections in l994 altered both the 
composition of the parliament and president. 
Ukraine’s new 1996 Constitution was the result of a 
compromise between the president and the 
parliament, as opposed to Yeltsin’s “revolutionary” 
approach, which involved an armed assault on the 
Russian parliament. 
Compromise was also a necessity. Ukraine is to 
build democracy, market, state institutions, and 
modern nation simultaneously (“quadruple 
transition”) [7; 11]. None of this could be achieved 
overnight, and it demanded compromises with the 
country’s post-Communist nomenclature. Under 
constant Russian threats, the logic for many national-
democrats was “not to undermine stability”. The 
drawback to Ukraine’s system of power-sharing and 
political compromise was that it preserved the 
influence of the Communist past, which, compared to 
Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic countries, was not 
radically restricted.
Ukraine is also too regionally and politically 
diverse to allow one force to monopolize power (also 
known as “pluralism by default” [13; 14]). Even 
when President Leonid Kuchma grew increasingly 
authoritarian, he was never able to implement the 
results of the 2000 referendum, which would have 
given him more power. Kuchma submitted six 
questions to voters, but the Constitutional Court 
deemed two of them unconstitutional (a situation 
which was difficult to imagine in Yeltsin’s or Putin’s 
Russia). Moreover, the Constitutional Court 
stipulated that the results of the 2000 referendum 
should be implemented through proper constitutional 
procedure, that is, by approval of two-thirds of MPs, 
which Kuchma failed to achieve. 
Another difference in Ukraine’s political 
culture, compared to Russia’s, is a stronger 
tradition of individualism, private ownership of 
land, and the absence of broad public support for 
an authoritarian leader. 
Independence transformed the status of previously 
provincial republic’s elite. The country’s political and 
business elites wanted to prevent further polarization 
of the country, which could lead to destabilization and 
thus threaten their interests. They also did not want 
concentration of power in the hands of one leader.
As a result, the 2004 Orange Revolution, with its 
slogan “bandits to prison”, also ended in compromise. 
The repeat run-off (or so called “third round”) 
resulted in Orange leader Viktor Yushchenko’s 
victory in exchange for the constitutional reform, 
which shifted power from the president to the 
parliament [9]. In 2006, as a result of a new coalition 
in the parliament, Yushchenko had to appoint Viktor 
Yanukovych, his rival in the 2004 elections, as prime 
minister. The next year Yanukovych had to agree to 
early parliamentary elections and accept the results, 
which again placed him in opposition.
The flip side of all these compromises (especially 
when they were not open to the public) was that they 
caused gridlock and postpone radical reforms.
What Went Wrong?
The main accomplishments of the revolution 
were political freedoms (including freedom of the 
press) and free and fair elections1. Elections in 
Ukraine did matter, and no political force has 
managed (until recently) to monopolize power. 
On the other hand, most aspirations of the Orange 
Revolution had not been realized, including 
strengthening the rule of law and judicial reform 
(contrary to Georgia, the struggle against corruption 
never started). This led to the frustration of the 
Orange electorate, especially those who voted for 
Yushchenko in 2004 and his political bloc, Our 
Ukraine, in 2006 and 2007.
Orange governments appeared to be ineffective. It 
created background for “thermidor”: the 2010 
election of president Viktor Yanukovych (who did 
not manage to win by falsifying elections in 2004). 
He quickly managed to cancel the constitutional 
reform of 2004 and returned to the constitutional 
model of president Kuchma. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the Orange Revolution has not led to 
creation of effective democratic checks and balances. 
What went wrong with the Orange Revolution?
Like in other post-Communist societies that 
have undergone democratization, broad opposition 
to the ancien regime after the Orange Revolution 
differentiated and split. This referred not only to the 
differences between the Orange leaders, the styles 
of president Viktor Yushchenko and prime minister 
Yulia Tymoshenko, or their approaches to economy 
and governance. It also referred to the institutional 
competition between the presidency and the cabinet 
that was caused by rushed and unbalanced 
constitutional reform in 2004: as more power moved 
to the parliament, the value of victory in the 2006 
parliamentary elections increased dramatically, and 
the whole campaign turned into a “fourth” round of 
the 2004 presidential election. Politics in Ukraine 
1 The country was recognized by the U.S.-based 
nongovernmental organization “Freedom House” as the only free 
country in the CIS (Georgia remained “partially free”) [3]. 
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became populist, and the Orange forces became 
hostages to electoral democracy. 
The “timing issue” contributed to failures of the 
Orange team. It is evident that some of the changes 
are to be done at the peak of the popularity. When 
Yushchenko’s rating was up to 70 %, it was possible 
to dissolve the parliament and have early elections 
in spring 2005 to create parliamentary majority for 
painful and unpopular reforms. In this case, it was 
not necessary to wait until elections of 2006 and 
play the populist games. 
Even if reforms are not popular, it is important to 
show that leaders in power are fighting corruption at 
the highest levels and within their own “inner 
circle”. This gives them the moral authority to call 
the people to “tighten the belts”; the anti-corruption 
struggle, however, remained on paper. 
If reforms are successful, it would be possible to 
raise the issues, which otherwise do not receive 
enough support in the country. On the contrary, when 
in 2008 Yushchenko’s ratings went down to 3–5 %, 
raising the issue of receiving NATO’s Membership 
Action Plan appeared counterproductive – it played 
into the hands of opposition, which continued to use 
anti-Western slogans. 
Victorious revolutionaries are to put the emphasis, 
first of all, on domestic transformations which would 
have a “demonstrational effect” on other countries. 
But after the Orange Revolution, both new Ukrainian 
authorities and the West put too much emphasis on 
the propaganda that Ukraine would bring democracy 
to other countries of the CIS, instead of concentrating 
on domestic transformations. 
Another paradox is that after the Orange Revolution 
Party of Regions benefitted from democratic freedoms, 
especially free access to media. Yanukovych 
strengthened his position by exploiting the populist 
opposition niche, which was particularly convenient at 
a time of economic crisis of 2008–2009. Prime minister 
Tymoshenko suffered from attacks from both the 
oppositional Party of Regions and president 
Yushchenko, who viewed her as the main competitor 
in the future 2009–2010 presidential election. 
Faliure to Institutionalize Democratic Changes
There are steps that every country, which is in the 
process of democratic transformation, desperately 
needs: prevention of the monopolization of power, 
administrative reform, judicial reform, anti-
corruption campaign, local self-government, creation 
of the public TV etc. 
As mentioned above, the 2004 constitutional 
reform in Ukraine created a new design: the prime 
minister would rely on a parliamentary majority and 
the president could not remove him/her, unlike 
before. This was something that had been demanded 
by democratic forces for many years. On the other 
hand, the reform appeared to be hectic and 
inconsistent. The president and prime minister, 
whether it was Yanukovych or Tymoshenko, were 
trying to secure separate, and sometimes parallel, 
structures of power. 
There was a debate as to whether the 2004 
reform should be cancelled, since the Constitutional 
Court (CC) had not approved several constitutional 
changes in advance. Although, there were formal 
grounds to cancel the 2004 reform, Yushchenko did 
not go ahead with it. He also lost time to introduce 
his own plan for reforming the Constitution.
Judicial reform was not implemented. The judges 
of the CC were appointed, not on the basis of 
professional criteria, but on presidential and 
parliamentary quotas depending on their political 
affiliation. Instead of suggested balance, it led to 
extreme politicization and splits within the CC, even 
causing the work of the Court to come to a halt [4]. 
Under Yushchenko, elections were free and fair, 
but the electoral system was left unmodernized. 
Until 1998, Ukraine had an electoral system with 
single-mandate districts. Because the country’s 
political parties were weak, 50 % of MPs were non-
party deputies. This led to unstable parliamentary 
factions. Deputies were subject to pressure from the 
president and could easily move from one faction to 
another, so by the end of every term there were 
about a dozen factions. In 2003, Ukraine switched 
to a purely proportional system with a 3 % threshold. 
It resulted in five political forces in the parliament. 
This outcome structured the Ukrainian parliament 
more along party lines. 
However, voters were made to choose between 
closed all-national party lists. This system also 
concentrated power in the hands of party leaders 
who composed the list. Most analysts agree that the 
best way to support party development is to 
introduce open and regional party slates. This 
would help to create European-style political 
parties, based not on a single leader, but rather on a 
specific set of programs and values. 
The chance for all these reforms under the 
Orange governments was lost. It had dramatic 
consequences after the Orange forces lost the 2010 
presidential elections.
Russian Pressure, Western Reservations
Domestic reforms need favorable international 
environment. In the meantime, Kyiv does not feel 
itself secure. In 1994, Ukraine got rid of its arsenal 
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of nuclear weapons, the third largest in the world. 
But the 1994 Budapest Memorandum provided 
only “security assurances”, not “guarantees” to 
Ukraine2, and ongoing territorial claims and 
provocative statements by Russian politicians did 
not contribute to Ukraine’s sense of security [1]. 
Ukraine appeared in the so called “grey zone of 
(in)security” or “vacuum zone”. Compared to most 
of its neighbors which first joined NATO, and then 
it eased joining the EU, Ukraine has not received 
even NATO’s Membership Action Plan for which 
it applied in 2008. 
The Western policy did not counteract the 
increasing Russian pressure. If before 2004 Russia 
was determined to discredit the independent 
Ukrainian state, since 2004 it was a matter of 
principle for Putin to discredit Ukrainian 
democracy both for his Russian and Western 
audience. Russia has attempted to persuade key 
European states that Ukraine is a ‘divided country’ 
with an unpredictable future. 
Whatever are the reasons, president Obama’s 
“reset policy” proclaimed at July 2009 Moscow 
summit was misread in Moscow as a sign of 
“Russia-first approach” and a possibility for Russia 
to re-gain its sphere of influence in the CIS. Next 
month, president Medvedev made his notorious 
video statement to Ukrainian people blaming 
Ukrainian authorities for “anti-Russian” actions 
[8]. It was direct interference into Ukrainian 
domestic affairs but the Western countries mostly 
remained silent. 
In the 2010 presidential campaign Yanukovych 
propaganda played on West’s passivity: “if EU does 
not want us, let us have a look to Russia”. 
Yanukovych used also Yushchenko’s mistakes who 
eloquently spoke about European and Euroatlantic 
integration, Ukrainian history and culture, equal 
partnership with Russia but whose policies turned 
out to be counterproductive. Contrary to the lessons 
of the 2004 campaign when Yushchenko avoided 
polarizing issues, in the 2010 presidential campaign 
he split society3. 
2 On December 5, 1994, the Budapest memorandum was signed 
by Russia, the United Kingdom and the USA (France and China 
joined later). The parties agreed to respect Ukraine's borders, to 
abstain from the use or threat of force against Ukraine, to support 
Ukraine where an attempt is made to place pressure on it by 
economic coercion and to bring any incident of aggression by a 
nuclear power before the UN Security Council.
3 Paradoxically, support for Ukrainian membership in NATO 
was higher under Kuchma than under Yushchenko. Polls by the 
Kyiv-based Razumkov Center showed that in June 2002 the numbers 
of those who supported joining NATO and those against were nearly 
equal – approximately 32 percent each. In July 2009, at the end of 
Yuschenko’s term, only 20 percent supported NATO membership 
while 59 percent rejected it [10].
Under Yushchenko, agreement on Ukraine’s 
access to WTO was finalized and ratified in 2008. 
But as there were no economic successes within the 
country, this step was used by opposition to blame 
Orange forces “for selling Ukraine to the West”.
The most critical issue remained Ukraine’s 
dependency on Russia for energy, first of all, gas, 
which resulted in the Russia-Ukraine “gas war” in 
winter 2009. At first, EU countries portrayed it as a 
commercial dispute between two countries and 
were not going to intervene. Some Ukrainian 
analysts likened this position to a “new Munich”. 
Only when Europe faced a serious energy threat, 
the EU sent in groups to monitor the gas metering 
stations between Russia and Ukraine and started to 
act as a mediator. But the time was lost, and new 
gas agreement with Russia appeared to be very 
unfavorable for Ukraine. 
The agreement on association which Ukraine and 
the EU started to negotiate in 2008 will not resemble 
the “European association agreements” that the EU 
signed with many Central and East European states 
(from Poland to Romania in the first half of 1990s to 
the Western Balkans by the end of the 1990s), which 
offered an EU perspective for these states. Romania 
and Bulgaria at that stage, not to mention the 
turbulent Western Balkans, were in no better shape 
than Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. But the 
EU limited itself to formulations that it “hails 
Ukraine’s European choice.” 
Therefore, the EU did not utilize its most 
powerful foreign policy instrument to influence 
developments in Ukraine – the conditionality of the 
accession process.
Let us compare the EU attitude towards Ukraine 
and Romania. The start of post-Communist 
transformation in Romania was to certain extent even 
more difficult than for Ukraine, as Ceauşescu regime 
was even more repressive that in the USSR. However, 
now Romania is a member of both NATO and the EU 
because of: 1) geopolitical consistency of Romanian 
elites whoever was in power: post-Communist Iliesku 
or anti-Communist Constantinesku; 2) even under 
communism, the West considered Romania as part of 
Europe, while even for independent Ukraine it is still 
necessary to explain that “it is not Russia” [5], but 
historically part of Europe.
One of the tests for the EU’s good will was visa 
issue. After the Orange Revolution, visas to 
Ukraine for EU citizens were abolished. At the 
same time, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland joined 
the Schengen zone and introduced Schengen entry 
requirements for Ukrainian citizens in December 
2007 that made it more difficult for Ukrainians to 
gain entry into those countries. 
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In January 2008, two EU – Ukraine agreements, 
one on visa facilitation and one on readmission, 
took effect. It was a kind of “package deal”. 
Ukrainian critics of the readmission agreement 
blamed the Orange leadership that it would make 
Ukraine a “dumping ground for illegal migrants” 
(although the agreement provided for special 
financial assistance and a two-year postponement 
for the return of third-country nationals.). As for 
the visa facilitation agreement, it was supposed to 
make it easier for Ukrainian citizens to get short-
stay visas and simplify the criteria for multiple-
entry visas for students, businessmen, journalists, 
and close relatives. However, common people 
continued to feel the West is still discrediting 
Ukraine4.
The paradox is that negotiations over association 
agreement and visa-free regime were boosted after 
Orange forces lost the 2010 presidential elections 
and Ukraine under Yanukovych started to backslide 
from democracy. So, if they finish successfully, it 
would be the new anti-Orange regime which 
capitalizes on these successes in its propaganda 
campaign within Ukraine.
4 According to monitoring by the Center for Peace, Conversion 
and Foreign Policy of Ukraine in 2009, 55 % of respondents had the 
potential right to obtain long-term visas, but only 20 % received 
visas for more than 5 months. Only 0,5 % of respondents received 
visas with a term of more than one year (for 2–3 years), and most of 
them were issued by Poland. About 15 % of the respondents waited 
for a consular decision for more than 10 days (as defined by the 
agreement) [12].
Conclusion
Ukrainian opposition in 2004 was united, it used 
non-violent, peaceful methods, demonstrated ethnic 
and inter-confessional tolerance. Also, it used splits 
among ruling elite, within security forces and army’s 
non-interference. International support to civil 
society, independent media outlets (first of all, 
Internet), small and medium business, independent 
exit polls contributed to its victory. 
However, results of the revolutions which 
brought freedoms should be institutionalized. 
Instead of talking much about the values of 
democracy as an example for neighboring countries, 
new authorities are to demonstrate to electorate at 
least small successes in everyday life. Not even 
economic successes, but social justice is a key word 
to make an effective appeal to the public. But in 
Ukraine judicial reform and anti-corruption 
campaign were not implemented. 
Also, compared to its Western neighbors, Ukraine 
have not received clear signal from the EU about its 
European perspective. It reflected natural frustration 
with chaos created by incompetence of Orange 
leaders and highlighted again the importance of 
general principle: to support not persons but their 
policies, programmatic values, and institutional 
changes. Along with direct, high-level interaction, 
international support to local civil society 
organizations could play a critical role “”in preserving 
the fragile democracies. 
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у чоМу пРичиНи НеВдач поМаРаНчеВої РеВолюції?
У статті аналізуються причини невиконання обіцянок лідерів Помаранчевої революції щодо 
реформ в Україні. Підкреслюючи вплив стосунків у трикутнику ЄС – Україна – Росія, автор у той 
же час наголошує на первинності впливу внутрішніх чинників. 
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CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND REPERTOIRE OF CONTENTION  
IN UKRAINE: THE CASE OF EUROMAIDAN
The article introduces the paradigm of contentious politics to study the Euromaidan events in Ukraine, 
describing the mechanisms of contention politics in the events of November 2013 – February 2014. Special 
attention is paid to the repertoire of contention, which remained rigid during 1991–2013, but has evolved 
after January 19, 2014 due to structural reasons.
Keywords: contention, collective action, protest, Euromaidan.
The political turmoil quivering Ukraine in 
November 2013 – February 2014 is defined by 
observers and participants in different ways: as a 
“protest” [2; 23], a “revolution” [5; 22], a “riot” 
[4; 6], an “insurgency” [1; 3; 10] etc. All those 
qualifications tend to be misleading, because 
application of a particular notion depends on 
political partisanship of its author. Moreover, 
conceptions like “revolution” or “insurgency” imply 
that political process they describe is highly 
abnormal. Both propensity to define the events in 
Ukraine subjectively and their perceived anomalous 
features contribute to dramatic interpretations. 
Society considers the situation in Ukraine as 
exceptional, catastrophic, and cataclysmic: there are 
numerous predictions of upcoming civil war, 
intervention, or even suggesting Ukraine to be a 
“failed state” [2].
In this article, I argue that a coherent 
comprehension of the events in Ukraine in 
November 2013 – February 2014, also known as the 
“Euromaidan”, requires introducing of a value-free 
notion. Hereafter I argue that introducing the notion 
of “contentious politics” will provide a more 
accurate explanation of the events. 
The article begins by exploring the theoretical 
foundations of the contentious politics’ paradigm. 
Secondly, preference of this paradigm in analysis 
the Euromaidan events is demonstrated. Thirdly, 
I study the repertoire of contention in Ukraine in 
historical perspective in order to explain its 
evolution in January 2014.
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